China Provoked Takaichi into Risky Move of Dissolving House of Representatives, But It’s a Gamble She Just Might Win

By Yuko Mukai

8:00 JST, February 7, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who took office only last October, announced her decision to dissolve the House of Representatives in January. This act of dissolution, often called the “secret weapon” of the top leader because the prime minister can choose the most advantageous timing for themselves, is a serious political gamble. Skillfully using this power at the right moment can increase the number of seats in the lower house and strengthen the ruling party’s governing foundation. However, misjudging voters’ sentiments can result in the prime minister losing his or her title.

The late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe masterfully timed this difficult decision multiple times, successfully solidifying his power base in the process. Takaichi, who identifies herself as “Abe’s successor” and who has appointed several advisors who served him, has taken a similar bold political course. Yet, an unexpected actor was pushing her from behind the scenes: China.

What does this mean?

The story goes back to Takaichi’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency scenario on Nov. 7 last year. During a House of Representatives Budget Committee session, she stated if China were to impose a maritime blockade on Taiwan and use force against U.S. military forces arriving to support the island, it “could constitute” a survival-threatening situation for Japan as defined by the security-related laws.

China seized on her statement to launch a fierce political and gray-zone campaign against Japan. Beijing brought up historical issues on the international stage, aiming intense criticism at Japan. It restricted travel to Japan by Chinese tourists, limited exports (again) of rare earths to Japan, and, in addition to increased patrols around Japan’s Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, engaged in dangerous acts such as Chinese fighter jets twice locking radar on Japanese fighters.

From the outset, concerns arose within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and business circles that China’s backlash against Takaichi’s remark would be prolonged, which led to calls for her to retract it. To be clear, the Takaichi Cabinet, formed while the ruling party was in a fragile state in the Diet, had a weak governing foundation. It was obvious that if public opinion turned negative, Takaichi’s political future would face immense difficulties.

David Stilwell, who served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the first administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, explained China’s strategy: “What Takaichi said is nothing new. What the People’s Republic of China is doing is they’re challenging her. Since she’s new, they’re taking the opportunity to pressure her and watch how she reacts.” He added, “They’re going to take a very insignificant thing she said on Taiwan and blow it up and make a big deal of it, and then try to get her to make concessions.”

However, Takaichi did not retract her remarks, and public opinion aligned with her position.

Why has Takaichi’s stance gained support?

It stems from bitter feelings toward China that have been growing among the Japanese public over a long period.

According to a Japanese government survey initiated in late 1970s, during the 1970s and 1980s when “Japan-China friendship” was a slogan of the government, around 70% of people felt friendly toward China. However, this plummeted after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, when China crushed pro-democracy student demonstrators. Estimates of the death toll range from several hundred to 10,000, and the exact number remains unknown today.

After this incident, which made the Japanese people aware of their neighboring country’s true nature, Japanese sentiment toward China worsened when multiple anti-Japan demonstrations happened in China throughout the 2000s. Now, the latest survey conducted in 2024 showed 84% of Japanese people do not feel friendly toward China.

China’s pattern of exerting pressure and seeking concessions from Japan whenever Japan acts contrary to China’s self-interest has become established in Sino-Japanese relations. Examples of China forcing the Japanese government to reverse policies through pressure date back to the 1980s. One example that is still fresh in the memory of Japanese people today is the 2010 incident when Japan arrested the Chinese captain of a fishing boat that damaged Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessels off the Senkaku Islands. China intensified pressure through measures such as halting rare earth exports and detaining Japanese nationals. The then administration of the Democratic Party of Japan under Prime Minister Naoto Kan released the captain.

Then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, a participant in talks with the Japanese side, described the events of 15 years ago as “such an important case study” for understanding China’s behavior. When I interviewed him in December, he reflected on the response of the Japanese government at the time, which was under intense pressure from China. “I think some of the senior Japanese interlocutors had convinced themselves that if they could basically make a case to the Chinese, that they could get them to understand and back down.”

He added: “My modest observation to them was that that will never happen; the Chinese are not going to back down. It’s a nationalist issue, and they will continue to pursue their views. They cannot yield under any circumstances on a nationalist territorial matter.”

According to a former senior official who was a cabinet minister at the time, the “prosecutor’s decision” to release the captain was only nominal. In reality, it was Kan’s own decision, made out of concern over China’s backlash. The Japanese leadership at the time naively believed they had the ability to change China’s trajectory. As a result, Japan was diplomatically defeated by China.

As Campbell had foreseen, China was never satisfied and used this opportunity to strengthen its claim to the Senkaku Islands, which are Japanese territory. When the Japanese government nationalized the islands in 2012, anti-Japanese demonstrations spread to more than 100 cities in China, with mobs throwing stones at Japanese diplomatic facilities and destroying and looting Japanese supermarkets in various locations. It is believed that these were “government-orchestrated demonstrations” tolerated and even approved by the authorities. What incited the Chinese demonstrators here was the “anti-Japanese sentiment” ingrained in modern Chinese minds through school education and films, which have emphasized the brutal actions of the Imperial Japanese military over 80 years ago. The demonstrations, which openly displayed anti-Japanese sentiment, became a decisive factor in worsening Japanese sentiment toward China.

Fundamentally, anti-Japanese sentiment is a state policy of the Chinese Communist Party, which controls the government. It is often perceived as an emotional fixation stemming from Imperial Japan’s past invasions of China during World War II, but this is not the full explanation. It is also the case that the Chinese Communist Party has emphasized the history of past invasions to heighten national patriotism. The dictatorial one-party regime also utilizes specific diplomatic issues to incite “anti-Japanese sentiment” as a way to prevent the Chinese people’s dissatisfaction, such as over economic stagnation, from turning inward against the Chinese government.

The grand parade celebrating “the 80th anniversary of victory in the war of resistance against Japan” held in Beijing on Sept. 3 last year, to which President Xi Jinping invited leaders from Russia and North Korea, vividly demonstrated that anti-Japanese themes are a strategic tool to advance the party’s own aim of establishing an axis in opposition to liberal democracy. However, excessive anti-Japanese sentiment carries risks to the party itself. Therefore, the Chinese Communist Party regime, needing to control all forms of demonstrations, has manipulated relations with Japan by playing the anti-Japanese card and then deliberately retracting it to suit its goals.

The key point is that Japan’s approach does not determine the shape of its relationship with China. Abe’s 2014 visit to China as prime minister starkly illustrates this. Despite there having been no significant change in the Senkaku Islands conflict — a root cause of Sino-Japanese tensions — China accepted his visit because it was hosting that year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Beijing and needed to save face, as well as needing to fix its damaged economic ties with Japan.

China’s guiding principle is easily understood by looking at Taiwan, over which China also claims sovereignty. No matter how deftly former President Tsai Ing-wen managed her Democratic Progressive Party’s traditional stance of advocating Taiwan independence, focusing instead on managing cross-strait relations with a pragmatic stance of maintaining the status quo, China never showed any willingness to engage in dialogue. Consequently, no matter how low-key current President Lai Ching-te’s actions may be, the fierce criticism directed at him never ceases.

Perhaps the root of the problem is that China fails to see Japan correctly. The Japanese people are not mere political bystanders. They are influential players in regional and global politics. This may be a point incomprehensible to the Chinese Communist Party regime, which lacks a democratic electoral system and tightly controls its citizens’ lives. Surveys by The Yomiuri Shimbun show that the Takaichi-led LDP has momentum in the current House of Representatives election campaign. If she wins, Takaichi could solidify her political foundation and become able to lead a more stable administration.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced his endorsement of Takaichi on Thursday. He also announced that he will meet with her at the White House on March 19. Trump seems to expect Takaichi’s victory in the election. Takaichi is a conservative politician whose policies largely align with those of the Trump administration, and at present, Japan-U.S. relations appear to be in good shape.

However, concerns remain regarding the relationship between Takaichi and Trump. In a Nov. 24 phone call with Takaichi, Trump reportedly expressed concern over the deterioration of Japan-China relations and urged her to lower the volume on Taiwan. Xi had previously called Trump and fed him their narrative that Takaichi was engaging in provocative actions concerning Taiwan. Overall, Japan expected to gain the overt support of the United States, but the Trump administration’s outward message of support on this matter has been notably weak.

Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing in April and to try to demonstrate a “good” relationship with Xi in order to secure a “big” trade deal.

In this delicate political situation, Takaichi must convey to Trump before his visit to China what China’s true intentions are, and that allies and partners like Japan and Taiwan, while striving to enhance their defense capabilities and spending, still need the strong backing of the United States. This is an extremely challenging task. But at least, an election victory will give her a more solid foothold in relations with the United States, and by extension with China.

Political Pulse appears every Saturday.

Yuko Mukai

Yuko Mukai is a Washington correspondent of The Yomiuri Shimbun.