University of Tokyo Professor Discusses Japanese Economic Security in Interview Ahead of Forum

Prior to the Tokyo Economic Security Forum, The Yomiuri Shimbun interviewed experts who are scheduled to attend from Japan and the United States about challenges surrounding economic security and how the international community should address them together.

The following is excerpted from an interview with Kazuto Suzuki, a professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo, conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writer Kentaro Matsumoto.

The Yomiuri Shimbun

7:00 JST, December 14, 2025

The Yomiuri Shimbun: Where is economic security positioned in Japan’s growth strategy?

Kazuto Suzuki: Economic security is a major pillar of Japan’s growth strategy. Rare earths cannot be mined and delivered overnight. We need a long-term perspective on what we should invest in and how we can reduce Japan’s vulnerabilities.

The concept of “indispensability” is also important. Japan must consider producing things that other countries cannot, namely those requiring Japan’s “fine-tuning” expertise, such as raw materials and machine tools, semiconductor manufacturing equipment and semiconductor materials.

It will make Japan more indispensable if the next-generation Rapidus Corp. semiconductor known as “Beyond 2nm” can be mass-produced successfully in the country.

Yomiuri: How can we deepen cooperation with other countries in terms of economic security?

Suzuki: We need to identify areas and products where we can cover each other’s weaknesses and tackle challenges. Japan is in competition with other nations in automobile production.

However, shipbuilding is one area where Japan and the United States can cooperate, as the United States has lost its competitive edge in the field. That means Japan can help an important partner with its economic security.

The commercial drone market is dominated by China, but we can address this problem through cooperation among Japan, the United States, South Korea and Australia. The United States’ “America First” policy may hinder joint efforts, but it seems the United States is becoming more aware that no single country can break through this issue alone.

Yomiuri: What is Japan’s role regarding economic security?

Suzuki: There has been a rise in international interest in Japan regarding public-private partnerships for data sharing and securing critical materials. Through events like the Tokyo Economic Security Forum, Japan will take the lead in communicating its advanced economic security initiatives to the world, enhancing Japan’s global recognition.

We want this forum to provide a place for each nation to have reasonable discussions and to elevate it to the level of an economic security version of the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) or the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland.

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Economic Security Complicated by Hard Trade-Offs, Says Expert

The following is excerpted from an interview with Navin Girishankar, the president of the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent Hiroyuki Tanaka.

The Yomiuri Shimbun

7:00 JST, December 14, 2025

When I step back, if I look at the last decade, I would say there are four big shocks to this prevailing economic order.

Number one is the well-known China import shock, which is mercantilism. So, overcapacity by China, dumping in our markets, hollowing out our industrial base, causing some disruption.

[Then there] is what I would describe as a dual-use shock. Given [the] civil-military fusion policy on the part of China … there was a recognition that sensitive technologies, which had largely been, guarded through export controls so they don’t fall into dangerous hands, suddenly take on a new dimension.

[Another] big shock is what I would consider the malign action shock … We have recognized that IP theft is more rampant.

We have recognized that industrial espionage and cyber threats to critical assets, including infrastructure, various assets held by companies and governments, [and] importantly, data, these are all suddenly subject to malign actions by sovereign and sub-sovereign actors and sometimes proxy actors.

Finally, I would say the fourth big shock is what I call an innovation shock, because of I think the recognition that we are no longer the only locus or center of gravity. By we, I mean the U.S. and allies. We are no longer the center of gravity on global innovation across all technology areas; there are some in which China is the locus for global innovation.

I would say that there is a risk now that economic wars, technology wars, translate to hot wars, or hot wars bleed into economic wars, right? And so in that environment, you have seen fairly open reevaluation of the economic policies of the last 30 or 40 years, and the development of what I call economic security policies, what we all call that, and they come in different forms.

The tension between [these policies] is that they are sometimes at cross purposes.

You want to impose tariffs in order to either exercise leverage or undertake import substitution policies that undercut your allies, as we see currently. You want to impose, so that makes partnership very difficult.

You want to impose export controls to limit, you know, sort of dual-use risks at the same time. That requires [cutting] revenues for the very companies that are actually the innovators in their economy.

I would say tensions and trade-offs with the economic security policy agenda. It’s like a “trilemma.”

We should be prepared for a level of uncertainty in economic policy. That is inherent in the nature of these policies. The Trump administration is volatile, so no question their approach to the trade agenda has been erratic, and really created a lot of volatility.

We have to define … what’s the steady state, in terms of what this policy mix looks like, so that we can do two things, promote dynamism and preserve technology advantage.