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In addition to nuclear powers China and Russia, North Korea is now also believed to have the capacity for a nuclear attack. The need for U.S. extended deterrence to defend Japan with American military force, including nuclear weapons, has become real.
Both Japanese and U.S. governments must formulate concrete procedures in preparation for a contingency.
The foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States have held their first meeting on extended deterrence in Tokyo and agreed to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence arrangements.
The two countries have regularly held working-level discussions on extended deterrence since 2010 and have repeatedly confirmed that the United States will fulfill its defense obligations to Japan with conventional and nuclear forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
The two countries affirmed at the ministerial level that they will strengthen their deterrence capabilities due to the severe decline in the security environment around Japan.
China is believed to possess more than 500 operational nuclear warheads. Last year, North Korea stipulated in its constitution that it would strengthen its nuclear forces. Russia, which continues its aggression against Ukraine, has been threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons.
It is imperative that Tokyo and Washington deliberate closely and develop a highly effective system for cooperation based on real threats. The two nations should demonstrate the strong bond of their alliance both at home and abroad and enhance deterrence capabilities.
If they do so, there will be questions about the integrity of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons if U.S. forces use nuclear weapons around Japan. In particular, with regard to not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, problems could arise over calls at Japanese ports by nuclear submarines carrying nuclear arms.
In 2010, when the Democratic Party of Japan was in power, then Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada was asked about a possible port call by a vessel with nuclear weapons in an emergency situation. He replied, “The administration at that time will stake its own fate in making a decision.” This is still the position held by the government today.
Just because Japan does not possess nuclear weapons does not mean the country can remain immune to their use. The government should proactively consider how to respond to a crisis.
There is also a debate over whether the United States would really use nuclear weapons to defend Japan in a contingency.
It is a fact that the United States exercises influence in the Indo-Pacific region because Japan has provided bases for U.S. forces under the security treaty. To improve the credibility of extended deterrence, Japan needs to continue to support U.S. forces here.
The four ministers also agreed in their talks on overall security policies to strengthen the production system in Japan for surface-to-air missiles to intercept ballistic missiles and to export these missiles to the United States. The aim is to support the United States, which is short on ammunition and other supplies due to its military aid for Ukraine.
These efforts will also lead to a deepening of the alliance.
