China Rolled Out Cognitive Warfare Campaign During Japan’s Lower House Election

The Yomiuri Shimbun

15:00 JST, March 29, 2026

China appears to have launched a “cognitive warfare” campaign in tandem with the Feb. 8 House of Representatives election, according to a joint analysis of X and other social media posts by The Yomiuri Shimbun and Sakana AI.

China’s recent campaign followed a previous one launched after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Diet remark on Nov. 7 about a possible contingency involving Taiwan. Analysis also found that China focused on manipulating international public opinion by increasing the number of posts in English.

The Yomiuri and Sakana AI, a Tokyo-based startup, used artificial intelligence to extract and analyze narratives aligned with China’s criticism of Japan from across all X posts put up from Jan. 19, when Takaichi announced on dissolving the lower house, through mid-February.

A previous analysis of the same kind found that Beijing had launched a full-scale cognitive warfare campaign against Japan after its “six days of silence” following Takaichi’s statement in November that a Taiwan contingency could constitute a survival-threatening situation for Japan. Such a situation would allow Japan to excise the right of collective self-defense.

The Yomiuri and Sakana AI’s analysis found a total of about 1,400 X posts criticizing Japan on Jan. 19. The number of such posts continued to rise to about 1,700 on Jan. 23 when the lower house was dissolved, and to about 1,800 on Jan. 27, when the election campaign officially began. The number peaked at 4,000 on Feb. 8, the day ballots were cast.

The scale of the latest cognitive warfare campaign was not as large as that in November.

Regarding the content of the narratives, many of those posted in November were related to criticism of Japanese politics and leaders, as well as the Taiwan issue and interference in domestic affairs.

Many of those posted during the lower house election period were about criticism linked to Japan’s domestic affairs — such as militarization and a resurgence of militarism in Japan, and Japan’s decline and economic vulnerability.

In particular, the number of posts related to criticism of Japanese politics and leaders increased as election day approached.

There was also a sharp increase in the number of English-language posts criticizing Japan, according to an analysis by language of anti-Japan posts put up by accounts affiliated with the Communist Party of China from November to January.

From Nov. 14 to 20, when the large-scale campaign was rolled out, the number of anti-Japan posts in English was approximately four times those in Japanese. In December, about 560 of roughly 900 anti-Japan posts were in English. Likewise in January, English posts accounted for just over half of about 300 such posts.

Regarding the anti-Japan posts around the time of the dissolution of the lower house and the general election, a source close to the Japanese government said, “They may have put up intimidating posts regarding a Taiwan contingency in an attempt to influence voting behavior.”

Citing the fact that Takaichi’s Cabinet had maintained high approval ratings in polls by various Japanese media outlets even after China’s full-scale cognitive warfare campaign in November, the source said, “China may have considered that the impact of the campaign on Japanese public opinion would be limited and therefore decided to focus on a cognitive warfare campaign targeting international public opinion.”

A source close to the Chinese government said China’s policy for Japan during February’s lower house election period was to “continue attacking Takaichi and maintain tactical pressure on Japan.” Regarding its foreign policy since Nov. 13, the source said, “China aimed to prevent countries that do not support China from siding with Japan.”

China appears to have focused on disseminating English messages so as to spread its claims within the international community.