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If U.S. President Donald Trump continues to bloviate about his dissatisfaction with the Japan-U.S. security framework, it could have a negative influence on the alliance and its deterrent power could be diminished.
While he may aim to get the upper hand in negotiations with Japan, Trump’s assertion that “we pay hundreds of billions of dollars to defend them [Japan], but they don’t pay anything” is clearly wrong.
There is an urgent need to correct this factual error and deepen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.
Regarding the Japan-U.S. intergovernmental talks on U.S. tariff measures, Trump initially insisted that the cost of military assistance would also be a subject of negotiations. However, in the end the issue has been set aside.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s assertions that the United States is forced to shoulder many defense burdens for its allies are likely to continue.
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, while Japan provides bases to the United States.
In addition, the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement stipulates that the U.S. side bears the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, excluding land rent and other base-related costs. However, in the 1970s, as the U.S. side demanded that Japan bear a greater burden, the two sides concluded another agreement to increase expenditures by the Japanese side.
As a result, the Japanese side’s share of the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan for the five-year period from fiscal 2022 has risen to over ¥1 trillion.
The Japan-U.S. security framework cannot be called a one-sided setup, and it can be said that it balances the obligations of both Japan and the United States.
Furthermore, Japan enacted the security-related law in 2015 to make it possible for the Self-Defense Forces to protect U.S. naval and other vessels.
The Japanese government should persistently explain to the U.S. side the actual situation in which Japan supports the activities of the U.S. military.
At the same time, as the security environment around Japan is deteriorating, it is also essential to deepen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.
A possible option would be for Japan to enhance its response capabilities through joint development of defense equipment with the United States and increase Japan’s purchases of U.S.-made equipment. Cooperation in ship-building and other areas is worthy of consideration.
However, there have been many cases in which Japan purchased equipment from the United States, but the delivery has been delayed. A total of six state-of-the-art F-35 stealth fighter jets, which were scheduled for deployment in Japan in fiscal 2024, have yet to arrive.
This will make it difficult to gain support from the Japanese people if Japan intends to buy more equipment from the United States.
Japan also needs to enhance its defense capabilities. The government is in the process of increasing defense spending to a total of about ¥43 trillion over the five years from fiscal 2023. But the government reportedly may not be able to procure equipment as planned due to soaring prices. Increasing the spending will be an important issue to consider.
